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Introduction 
 
Macedonia is a small relatively open economy and its interest rate policy is very 
much linked to its exchange rate policy. The more integrated it became with the 
international financial market the more the interest rate policy will be dependent 
on the exchange rate regime. 
 
One reason to analyze the behavior of the interest rate level in Macedonia is the 
differential between the interest rates in Macedonia and the Euro zone. In 
accordance with the uncovered interest rate parity, the more open the economy is 
the domestic interest rate should be converging to the Euro zone interest rate. If 
the difference, i.e. the parity spread, is high in an environment of integrated 
financial sector and Macedonia and still experiencing high interest rates, then the 
differential may be explained as a premium for the expectation of future 
depreciation and/or devaluation of the Macedonian Denar. Explanation then 
might be that there exist a misalignment within the fixed exchange rate regime in 
Macedonia thus, creating incentives for the market to expect 
depreciation/devaluation. The type of expectation (whether they are rational or 
adaptive) is very important, as shown in this paper. Within this concept it is 
important that the National Bank of Macedonia – NBRM has developed a 
program to improve the institutional framework for monetary policy, in 
particular, data analysis, market development, and monetary instruments (see 
IMF country report 2005). 
 
Rationalizing this, we must not forget the high intermediation spread that exists 
in the Macedonian banking sector that could be reflection of some 
microeconomic reasons for the relatively high interest rates (premium for the 
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inefficient enforcement of the bankruptcy and collateral laws (latest information 
from the NBRM is that Macedonian banks claim 25bln MKD that are in court 
procedure some of them since 1993), lack of competition in the banking sector 
(even though the Macedonian experience is more an one of having high 
concentration in the banking sector thus, leading to oligopoly), high level of 
nonperforming loans, moral hazard issues related to bank bailout, possible 
existence of a pocket money banks and signaling and asymmetric information 
problems etc. 
 
Macedonia conducts a de facto peg system since 1995 even though many 
countries with a substantial contact to international capital markets have 
abandoned the facto or “soft pegs” from their terminology; see Stanley Fischer 
(2001). Those remaining like China have a capital controls in place. On the other 
side, Mussa and the others (2000) say that if a country have limited involvement 
with global financial markets some form of exchange rate peg or band or highly 
managed float is generally more viable and more appropriate for them. There are 
many questions and debates in the literature and finding what is proper for 
Macedonia is a challenge.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. First, the need to measure capital openness is 
discussed, and then some measures are illustrated. Further, a model for 
Macedonia and the results are presented with rational and adaptive expectations. 
I end the paper with a discussion on connection of capital openness and the 
institutional set up and the conclusion. This research needs to be improved with 
how the area is regulated in Macedonia. 
 
Why measuring the capital account openness 
 
The globalization, accelerated development of the financial market, the 80s debt 
crises and the 90s currency crises gave the BoP related analyses a new boost. 
The analyses of capital account being of particular interest and raise the interest 
of CEA for more detailed technical analyses. Questions were discussed within 
CEA related to the measuring capital account openness and the context and 
benefit of such analyses.  
 
This part lists some aspects of the practical use of the measuring capital 
openness. Higher degree of openness on one side may allow increased ability to 
finance larger current account deficits and increase the level of foreign savings 
and may affect the efficiency of capital allocation thus, reduce distortion with 
higher return on investment and higher productivity growth. On the other side 
Stiglitz (2002) argues that pressuring emerging countries in the 90s to relax the 
barriers on capital flow was a mistake and led to currency crises.  
 
What would be country specific to Macedonia to argue for restricting capital 
integration? One reason for more restriction might be the country’s high 
vulnerability to external shocks and financial crises. The rapid expansion of 
bank credit, now in its third year, reflects a structural shift to more commercial 
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bank intermediation (credit growth accelerated in 2002, triggered by a decline in 
the interest rate on central bank bills and by more aggressive lending to 
households due to growing competition among banks). Neither the increases in 
interest rate on NBRM bills since late – 2003 nor the still high lending rate, have 
significantly dampened the credit boom, partly because much of the new lending 
is in, or indexed to, foreign currency. While the boom has raised credit risk, 
including from unhedged foreign exchange exposures by borrowers, the quality 
of banks’ loan portfolios has improved and stress tests suggest that balance sheet 
risks remain small (see more in IMF 2005).  
 
Even if the IMF’s stress tests show small balance sheet risks, the possible 
evergreening might easily occur in the banking sector if the borrowers were not 
as creditworthy as the risk managers from the banks estimated, having in mind 
the business environment in Macedonia. That is why it is important that an 
overall strong monetary institution with good financial regulation and strong 
supervision are on place. Strong institutional set up could help reducing 
vulnerability and the interest rates and set a firm ground for implementing more 
growth oriented policies.  
 
This leads us to the question how the openness of the capital account affects 
economic growth. Macedonia has a poor economic growth and we might want to 
investigate if the capital account openness is a determinant for the economic 
growth and also, when is the right sequencing to free the market further. 
Sebastian (2000) shows that there is an evidence that an open capital account 
positively affects growth only after a country has achieved a certain degree of 
economic development. Further, he concludes, that this provides support to the 
view that there is an optimal sequencing for capital account liberalization. For 
Macedonia thus, still remain the question how much is the capital account open. 
The more open the capital account the higher the ability to finance larger current 
account deficits. But, does the economic growth in Macedonia provide that 
certain degree of economic development as Sebastian points out? 
 
In relation to the economic growth and investment, the degree of openness of the 
capital account is affecting the degree to which the expansionary fiscal policy is 
crowding out the private investment and the ability to which the monetary policy 
affect the aggregate demand.  
 
Another important reason to analyze capital account openness is the correlation 
between the capital account openness and the external crises in the face of the 
possible sudden stops of inflow of capital and current account reversals. The 
point is to make a judgment of the degree of vulnerability to external crises 
depending on the openness of the capital account and how this affects the 
economic growth. Sebastian (2004) finds no systematic evidence suggesting that 
countries with higher capital integration face a higher probability of having 
crises. But he also finds that once a crisis occurs, countries with higher capital 
mobility may face higher costs in terms of economic growth decline.  
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In the case of Macedonia the more it is integrated in with the global capital 
market the higher the risk of high volume of capital inflow being reduced 
significantly in a short period of time, which is the sudden stop and the possible 
reductions in the current account deficit within a short period of time, which is 
the reversal.  
 
I use here the opportunity to quote Mundel (1961) from his classical paper on a 
point that is very relevant for the Macedonian case: “It is patently obvious that 
periodic BoP crises will remain an integral feature of the international economic 
system as long as fixed exchange rates and rigid wage and price levels prevent 
the terms of trade from fulfilling a natural role in the adjustment process. It is 
however far easier to pose a problem and to criticize the alternatives than it is to 
offer constructive and feasible suggestions for the elimination of what have 
become an international disequilibrium system”.  
 
One of the main structural factors considered by Mundell (1961) and latter 
McKinnon (1963) is the factor mobility. Macedonia, as one with fixed exchange 
rate, if it have high capital and labor mobility, vis-à-vis the EU countries with 
which it fix the exchange rate, will have less need for exchange rate adjustment 
and will be better off with the existing regime. But how much is the capital 
mobile and how much is the labor mobile is a matter for further empirical 
research.  
 
Measures of the capital account openness 
 
One simple measure of capital openness is the inflow of capital as percentage of 
GDP. A useful presentation of the behavior of capital flows as % of GDP one 
can find in Sebastian (2000).  
 
In Macedonia the direct investment and the portfolio investment are relatively 
low (average for the period 1998-2004 of $ US 92 per capita or cumulative FDI 
and portfolio investments of 5 % of cumulative GDP for the same period).  
 
The degree of capital market integration can be estimated by examining the 
convergence of the private rate of returns to capital across countries. In their 
famous work Feldstein and Horioka (1980) analyzed the behavior of the saving 
and investment. The argument there was that in an environment of perfect 
capital mobility there is no correlation between the saving and investment. 
Interesting results from the work of Montiel (1994) after implementing the 
Feldstein and Horioka approach is the benchmark of saving ratio coefficient of 
0.6. If a country has a coefficient of regression higher than 0.6 it can be said that 
the country has a rather closed capital account. Another interesting work, on this 
rather quantitative indicator (the saving-investment), is presented by Buch 
(1999). A price measure of capital mobility shows that in integrated financial 
markets rates of return on identical financial assets must be the same. 
 
One test of the degree of capital mobility uses the fact that the assumption of 
international mobility of capital implies that consumers can smoothen 
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consumption over time by borrowing and lending on (international) capital 
markets. Hence, tests on the correlation of consumption and net domestic output 
can be used to assess the degree of capital mobility, see Bayoumi (1998). 
 
Klein and Olivei (1999) use the IMF’s exchange arrangements and exchange 
restrictions data to construct index of capital mobility. The index is defined as 
the number of years that in accordance with the IMF’s binary data the country in 
question has had an open capital account.  
 
Another interesting measure for effective degree of financial openness of an 
economy is the Stilianos and Christopher cointegration test of interactions 
among the current account, budget balances and real interest rates.  
 
Measuring capital account openness in Macedonia 
 
Back in 2003 the USAID’s Fiscal Reform Project invited Prof. King Banaian to 
investigate the presence of high interest rates in Macedonia (see both King 
2003). In his findings Prof. Banaian proposed to the USAID project to 
investigate the degree of openness of the capital market in Macedonia and 
suggested the Sebastian and Khan (1985) and Haque and Montiel (1991) 
methodology. The context of his proposal was to give answer, beside explaining 
the presence of high interest rates in Macedonia, to whether the use of the 
exchange rate targeting in Macedonia has alternative as well.  
 
The idea was that if the capital market is relatively closed, than the observed 
differences in the interest rates between Macedonia and the rest of Europe are 
most likely due to domestic factors. The more open is the Macedonian economy 
the more problematic becomes the pegged monetary policy and the more it will 
contribute to the high interest rates.  
 
We cannot make a clear statement of weather the capital account in Macedonia 
is open thus, the presence of capital controls in Macedonia is an issue subject to 
empirical testing.  
 
The model 
 
Here a measure of openness of the capital account in an empirical environment 
follows the Edwards and Khan (1985) and Haque and Montiel (1991). The 
rational of the model is: 
 
The domestic interest rate - i is a structural feature of the economy and can be 
expressed as a weighted average of the uncovered interest parity rate - i* and the 
domestic “Endemic” interest rate if the capital market is closed - i’.  
 
The algebraic representation is: 
 
i = ψ i* + (1 – ψ) i’ or i – i* = (1 – ψ) * (i’ – i*); 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1     (1) 
 
Where the index of capital mobility - ψ is a measure of the openness thus: 
 
0 ← closed capital market ← ψ → open capital market → 1 
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ψ → 1 open thus, external financial influences outweigh the domestic monetary 
factors in the determination of the domestic market clearing interest rate. 
 
ψ → 0 closed thus, external financial influences play no role in the 
determination of the domestic market clearing interest rate. 
 
The model is based on the money demand and supply approach rather than 
calculating the Fisher approach for the domestic interest rate.  
 
The standard money supply function is: 
 
M = R + D = R(-1) + D + ∆R     (2) 
 
R – domestic currency value of foreign exchange reserves 
D – stock of the domestic credit outstanding 
∆ – first difference operator 
 
By using the BoP identity, the money supply function can be written: 
 
M = R(-1) + D + CA + Kag + Kap     (3) 
 
CA – domestic currency value of the current account 
Kag – public capital account  
Kap – private capital account  
 
The money supply that would correspond to a situation with closed private 
capital account denoted as M’ is the actual money supply less the portion of 
reserve flows accounted for by private capital movements: 
 
M’ = R(-1) + D + CA + Kag = M – Kap     (4) 
 
The money demand function is:  
 
log (Md/P) = a0 + a1 * i + a2 * log(y) + a3 * log(M/P)(-1)     (5) 
 
y – real output  
P – domestic price level – CPI  
 
The interest rate i’ is that value of i that satisfies the money market equilibrium: 
 
log (M’/P) = log (Md/P) 
 
Thus, from the equation (5) we have: 
 
i’ = - (ao/a1) + (1/a1) * log(M’/P) – (a2/a1) * log(y) – (a3/a1) * log(M/P)(-1) (6) 
 
The following algebra will derive the equation that we should estimate. Firstly, 
we take equation (6) and substitute in (1). Secondly, we take the new expression 
of – i and substitute it in the money demand equation (5). Thirdly, take the result 
of this algebraic exercise and the equation (3) to derive the final specification for 
estimation: 
 
log(M/P)=-a0*(1–ψ)+a1*ψ*i*+(1-ψ)*log(M’/P)+a2*ψ*log(y)+a3*ψ*log(M/P)(-
1)+e      (7) 
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Data 
 
The dependent variable in our specification is the log of the real money supply 
measured as M1 (because I am using the money market interest rate) divided by 
the consumer price index-CPI. The independent variables are the logs of the 
lagged real money, real GDP, real value of – M’ (M1 minus the domestic 
currency value of private capital flows – inward direct investment and portfolio 
investment inflow) and the money market interest rate variable.  
 
The frequency is monthly data. For the monthly data I produce monthly GDP 
data from the quarterly GDP data by using the monthly industrial index data as 
weights. BoP and monetary data are from the NBRM. The GDP and industrial 
index data are from the State Statistical Office. For the foreign interest rate I use 
LIBOR/EURIBOR from the Deutsche Bundesbank statistics.  
 
Estimating rational expectations 
 
The interest rate variable – i in (7) is the defined uncovered interest parity 
condition. It is derived as money market interest rate plus expected depreciation 
in the exchange rate (that is proxied by the actual exchange rate change that 
takes place between periods): 
 
i = EURIBOR + E (∆ FX%)     (8) 
 
E – expectation operator 
FX% exchange rate change between periods 
 
The M’ was derived as M1 minus the MKD value of capital inflow.  
 
Since the specification incorporates rationally expected variable, a lagged 
dependent variable and an endogenous variable-log(M’/P); a generalized 
nonlinear two stage procedure (see Wickens 1982) was used in the estimation of 
the equation (7).  
 
To ensure that the instruments used show no contemporaneous correlation with 
the residuals, only the lagged values were used for EURIBOR, real GDP, money 
supply, CPI, imports, foreign exchange reserves, industrial index and exports. 
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Box 1. Rational versus adaptive expectations 
 
Philip (1994) show that uncovered interest parity test coefficients can be 
expressed as functions of the parameters of expectations mechanism. His 
research is on the base of usually rejection of the uncovered interest parity and 
rational expectations in the empirical studies. That is why I will reestimate the 
equation (7) with adaptive expectations by utilizing the Kalman filter latter. 
 
Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm for sequentially updating the one step 
ahead estimate of the state mean and variance given new information. It can be 
applied in our case to model unobserved variable with adaptive expectations. 
Technically, the procedure is to form a preliminary estimate of the state and then 
revising that estimate by adding a correction to it. The magnitude of the 
correction is determined by how well the preliminary estimate predicted the new 
observation.  
 
The Kalman filter can help in dealing with purely temporary shocks alternated 
with purely temporary shocks. It is also useful to implement a learning process 
and apply the Bayeseian approach to update the prior probabilities of the 
separate filters if the characteristic of the time series evolve over time. In this 
way we ensure not to use one fixed model for each and every time. More on the 
use of Kalman filter see in Bomhof (1983). See Sun (2000) for time varying 
coefficient of capital mobility within adaptive expectations. 
 
 
 
Results from a model with rational expectations 
 
The following table illustrates results from the two stage least squares non-linear 
estimation made in E-Views. We can see that the coefficient-C(2) estimate of ψ 
Dependent Variable: LM1CPI 
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Date: 10/13/05   Time: 20:03 
Sample(adjusted): 1997:10 2004:12 
Included observations: 87 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations 
LM1CPI=-C(1)*(1-C(2))+C(3)*C(2)*INTEIBOR+(1-C(2))*LOG(M1FDI) 
        +C(4)*C(2)*LOG(GDP)+C(5)*C(2)*DLM1CPI 
Instrument list: INTEIBOR(-1) GDP(-1) M1(-1) CPI(-1) IMPORT(-1) IND(
        -1) WAG(-1) FDI(-1) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 143.4910 343.7868 0.417384 0.6775
C(2) 0.995959 0.007049 141.2873 0.0000
C(3) 0.001522 0.002841 0.535765 0.5936
C(4) 0.090992 0.062978 1.444822 0.1523
C(5) 0.923898 0.036430 25.36079 0.0000
R-squared 0.938498     Mean dependent var 4.282949
Adjusted R-squared 0.935498     S.D. dependent var 0.087895
S.E. of regression 0.022323     Sum squared resid 0.040862
Durbin-Watson stat 1.795003    
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is almost 1 and the interpretation would be significant perfect capital mobility 
and financial integration. The money demand coefficients: C(1), C(3), C(4) are 
not significant and only the lagged money demand coefficient is significant-
C(5). I will not further investigate the economic rational and statistical 
performance of the estimation since I am focusing on the coefficient of 
openness.  
 
In January 2001 there was a significant inflow of investments in the 
telecommunication sector in Macedonia and that outlier can cause biased results.  
 
The split of time series in two periods, one from January 1999 until December 
2000 and the other from February 2001 until December 2004 shows the 
following results (E-Views prints available from the author upon request):  
 
Period  Coefficient C(2) estimate of ψ t-statistic 
1999:01 – 2000:12 0.874 12.785 
2001:02 – 2004:12 0.780 2.908 
 
Both estimations show significant relatively open capital account. The 
interesting finding is that in the second period the capital market is more closed.  
 
Results from a model with adaptive expectations 
 
The discussion in Box 1 preferred more the adaptive expectations and I have 
tested the data with the Kalman filter estimation. This is more realistic type of 
assumption because allows for a time varying parameter on openness of capital 
account as well. 
 
The results from the 
estimation on the time 
varying parameter are shown 
in the figure and were: 
 
1. The parameter shows 
significant closed 
capital account (E-
Views output 
available from the 
author upon request). 
The diffe2. rences in 
dependi
 
 
We can see the slump of the parameter from the investment made in 2001 
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the results are 
dramatically, 
ng on the 
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January. That is why again I have split the time series in the same two periods. 
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The results from these estimations were (E-Views output available from the 
author upon request): 
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From the above figures we can see that the capital account is closed in 
Macedonia with small changes across time. The relatively closed capital account 
has implications that the fixed exchange rate can still be a beneficial regime for 
the case of Macedonia if the economic agents have adaptive expectations.  
 
If the economic agents in Macedonia have adaptive expectations, the monetary 
policy in Macedonia still have relatively more powerful effect compared to the 
fiscal policy on the domestic demand and the trade balance. This further 
supports the findings from the research from Mr. Bryan Roberts on the crowding 
out effect in Macedonia (more in his presentation on the USAID Fiscal Reform 
Project held in the Ministry of finance). The NBRM should take this argument 
into account to further investigate the possible exchange rate misalignment 
(especially in the light of the new SBA with the IMF and the liability to keep the 
regime status quo) since the monetary policy has been shown as more important 
compared to the fiscal policy at the moment. Another reason why the 
misalignment might be important is that possible future anticipated regime’s 
adjustments might quickly be reflected in capital outflows. Maybe this is one of 
the reasons why Macedonia experiences a high interest rate and the economic 
agents actually are paying premium for the misalignment. This, of course, leads 
to high level of interest rates, low level of economic activity and economic 
growth.  
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The findings from the capital openness index do not reject the effectiveness of 
the impediments to capital flows but also are not evidence that the capital 
controls are effective.  
Box 2. The index of speculative pressure on an exchange rate regime-EMP 
as a proxy for 
rational 
expectations. 
 
It is interesting 
to investigate if 
a measure of an 
early warning 
system such as 
the Exchange 
Market Pressure 
– EMP can be 
used as a proxy 
for rational 
expectations. 
The EMP index 
is motivated by 
the idea that speculators do not always succeed in attacking an exchange rate 
regime and therefore speculative pressures cannot be captured by looking only at 
the nominal exchange rate data. 
 
The pressure that the exchange market gives to interest rates can be monitored 
by construction of an index for periods of high demand for foreign currency. The 
EMP index is constructed as a tool for measuring the speculative attacks on the 
foreign exchange market, i.e. it serves as an indicator of (non) occurrence of a 
currency crisis; see Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996): 
 
 
 
 
Critical (extreme) values of the index, which signal a crisis: EMP > 1.5 σ + µ. 
 
Thus, we might use the EMP as the proxy for rational expectations in the 
uncovered interest parity equation (8) and reestimate the equation (7): 
 
i = EURIBOR + E (EMP)     (9) 
 
The next figure is illustrating the quarterly EMP scores for Macedonia. 
 
Figure. Quarterly EMP scores for Macedonia (author’s calculations).  
 
However King and Ming (2005) have shown that the EMP index though useful, 
is rather ad hoc in treating the importance of different financial data. Their 
explanation is based on the feature that in most exchange rate regime, there are 
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 The capital openness and the institutional set up 
more periods of tranquility in which small, regular market disturbances 
dominate. In a period of tranquility, central banks ignore minor adjustments of 
financial markets, as they do not jeopardize the exchange rate regime. 
Theoretically, then, a rather nonlinear dynamics is to be expected whereas the 
EMP is based on a linear model. Their application to Macedonian data suggests 
that the skepticism for that linear model was justified and very poor to be used as 
an early warning system. But, this does not preclude using an early warning 
system as a proxy for rational expectations in some future extended work. 
 
The story for Macedonia is the one of lacking modern financial institutions and 
that increased capital mobility might induce costs and little benefits. If the 
capital account is more liberalized the domestic financial market might be more 
vulnerable.  
 
The market stabilizing role is on the NBRM with its supervision authority. On 
the other side we have the market regulating institutions as the Ministry of 
finance to correct certain market failures as to continue to impose or to reduce 
the capital flow with the amending in the legislation in joined cooperation with 
the NBRM.  
 
Another way to explain the importance of the issue is to ask whether there is 
openness of the capital account sufficient to concern the NBRM in its policy of 
fixing the exchange rate and to concern the government for the possible 
influence on economic growth.  
 
In Macedonia the interest rate differential is high compared with the EU 
countries thus, either there are capital mobility issues or the differential is due to 
lack of confidence of the exchange rate policy (that is the credibility of the 
NBRM’s policy). There is reason to believe that Macedonia pays an interest rate 
premium due to fear of depreciation. Is that fear rational is another issue. If there 
exist a thorough analyses from the NBRM on possible pros and cons to keep the 
current exchange rate policy is important to know because if they do not exist 
the arguments that are listed in the country report from the IMF are showing 
nothing more but non rational fear of floating in Macedonia. Still, the findings of 
closed capital account in an environment of adaptive expectations can be an 
argument for preferring the existing exchange rate regime. 
 
We know that with the fixed exchange regime and higher degree of capital 
mobility the monetary policy is less effective and the fiscal policy is the only 
tool to smooth the economic cycles. But are the Macedonian governments using 
the fiscal tools efficiently so far? The answer is easy, that even after a decade 
and more of transition Macedonia still experience low economic growth which is 
one credible outcome to measure the success/failure of Macedonian 
governments. That is why the targets of the new IMF’s SBA and the WB’s 
PDPL are of crucial importance to be fulfilled within the three years horizons.  
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The authorities in Macedonia still recognize the unstable economic environment 
thus; the fixed exchange regime and the possible further increase of the capital 
mobility and financial activity will most likely again increase the importance of 
the fiscal policy in affecting the aggregate demand. The NBRM should start to 
investigate the possible timing for exit strategy of the existing regime taking also 
in mind that with further increase of the capital mobility the possible exchange 
rate misalignment will have more adverse consequences. Still, the new country 
report of the IMF (2005) for Macedonia says: “The authorities recognized that 
some flexibility would sharpen banks’ and borrowers’ incentive to hedge foreign 
currency exposures but they viewed the arguments in favor of the peg as more 
persuasive. In particular, given the still unstable economic environment, they 
saw merit in retaining a clearly defined monetary anchor. In examining the 
alternatives, they took the view that inflation targeting or monetary aggregate 
targeting would be unworkable given the unpredictability of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. In contrast, limited flexibility—a narrow band—could 
be manageable. But this would have too small an effect on banks’ and 
borrowers’ behavior to justify the risks associated with departing from the 
existing well-functioning anchor.”  
 
A strong prudential regime is needed in Macedonia especially with experiencing 
credit boom and the questionable sensitivity of the companies and the 
households to the currency risk even though the banks are not directly exposed 
to the foreign exchange.  
 
In this context Chin and Ito (2005) shows that among emerging market 
countries, a higher level of bureaucratic quality and law and order, as well as the 
lower levels of corruption, increases the effect of financial opening in fostering 
the development of equity markets as well. They also find that the finance-
related legal/institutional variables do not enhance the effect of capital account 
opening as strongly as the general legal/institutional variables. In examining the 
issue of the sequencing, they find that the liberalization in cross-border goods 
transactions is a precondition for capital account liberalization. Their findings 
also indicate that the development in the banking sector is a precondition for 
equity market development and that the developments in these two types of 
financial markets have synergistic effects. 
 
Interesting consequence of the high interest rates is to investigate the role of the 
possible oligopoly in the banking sector within this context. The banking system 
in Macedonia has its own characteristics, as well as the general determinants that 
characterize the transition economies. The problem of high concentration in the 
sector and relatively large share of non-performing assets in the bank’s portfolio 
now is enhanced with the relatively low level of intermediation causing a 
financial market failure in Macedonia. The market failure of the market for 
lemons seems to apply in the supply and demand for bank’s intermediation as a 
product of asymmetric information. The problem of rigidity in the bank’s 
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interest rates, when the savings rose dramatically after the EURO conversion in 
Macedonia, only confirms the problem. One of the causes can be social capital 
deterioration and the lack of trust among the agents and reluctance to take a risk, 
both from the supply and from the demand side in this market.  
 
Conclusion 
 
? The complexity of the topic requires more time resources to investigate 
it in a satisfactory manner. So far I have started to set a ground for more 
extensive work I will conduct in near future, I hope. There are many 
issues with no consensus and it must be further investigated on what is 
relevant for Macedonia.  
? The topic of monitoring the capital market openness is of crucial 
importance for Macedonia given the confirmed dedication to the fixed 
exchange rate and the agreed with the new IMF arrangement as well.  
? Just for now it seams that Macedonia can keep the current exchange rate 
regime as long as capital markets remain relatively closed (if the 
expectations are adaptive). In that case the observed differences in the 
interest rates between Macedonia and the rest of Europe are most likely 
due to domestic factors. The more open becomes the capital market, the 
more problematic becomes the pegging monetary policy. The higher 
degree of the capital openness will require a choice of the corner 
solutions-either a more purely pegged exchange rate system – 
euroization or currency board or towards a purely floating system with 
either monetary aggregate nominal anchor or inflation as the nominal 
anchor (in accordance with the impossible trinity theorem).  
? NBRM will be less able to affect interest rates as capital markets open, 
if it continues to pursue a pegged exchange rate. If it continues to fix the 
exchange rate it will have only one policy tool to pursue the one goal, in 
accordance with the Tinbergen (1952) rule. It cannot target interest rates 
and fix the exchange rate regime at the same time. If it wants to target 
the interest rate it must allow for the exchange rate regime to float. The 
risk is that if it wants to hold down the interest rates to world level, in a 
floating environment, it would either print money or cause a loss of the 
reserves. This is why the institutional strength of the system is of 
importance.  
? The NBRM should conduct a thorough cost benefit analyses of 
removing/imposing capital controls in Macedonia. The cost of possible 
crises should be compared with the cost of having distortion in the 
capital market. This is of special interest for Macedonia which suffers 
from sectoral deficiencies. The speculative reversals, a decline in 
external competitiveness, exchange rate appreciation, loss of control 
over the monetary base and inflation are some of the detrimental effects 
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that can be provoked by surges in capital flows if the economy suffers 
from fundamental sectoral deficiencies (see Oplotnik 2002). 
? In Macedonia the concentration of export in the production sector is 
high thus, in terms of flexible regime every shock on the exporting 
sectors might result in radical disturbances in the price level.  
? Even though there is not much capital inflow in Macedonia it is of 
importance to analyze the results from stress test of the banking system 
response to external crises as the sudden stops and reversals in depth. 
Sebastian (2004) has shown that there are no significant relations among 
them. However, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) analyze the importance 
of joint occurrence of external crises and banking crises.   
? A separate technical issue is to conduct a thorough study on finding 
evidence on rational expectations versus the adaptive expectations in the 
case of Macedonia with a time varying parameters.  
? The IMF gave signals to Macedonia back in 2002 that the authorities 
could start to think about possible exit strategy but they were expecting 
thorough analyses from the Macedonian authorities. Whether there exist 
or not such analyses is important to know because if they do not exist 
the arguments that are in the country report from the IMF are showing 
nothing more but existence of fear of floating in Macedonia.  
? With the taken responsibility of the Macedonian government and the 
join effort of the new IMF’s SBA and the WB’s PDPL including the 
BERIS project, we are expecting more efficient administration services 
and lower levels of corruption that should increase the effect of further 
financial opening and fostering the development of equity markets as 
well. The IMF program supports increasing the flexibility of the labor 
market, raising the efficiency of the judicial system, and improving 
public sector governance and efficiency. These measures will be 
supported by continued prudent fiscal and monetary policies. This is 
more important for the potential investors to be active in a more 
developed Macedonian equity market.  
? In theory, capital account liberalization should allow for more efficient 
global allocation of capital, from capital-rich industrial countries to 
capital-poor developing2 economies. For Macedonia, the EU 
membership provides a strong incentive for policymakers to adopt and 
maintain sound policies, with obvious benefits in terms of long-term 
growth. On contrary, the expected membership will be unlikely to boost 
capital market integration to a significant degree and to trigger huge 
                                                 
2 I am using the term developing country, since the literature in this area is making the 
classification of developing and industrialized countries. However, the distinction 
between a country in transition and developing countries is very significant. In this paper 
I will not investigate further this important topic and its role on financial liberalization.   
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capital inflows in Macedonia. The membership in the EU will require 
that Macedonia abolish remaining entry barriers into their financial 
sectors and hereby import institutional stability. Seen from this angle, 
the benefits of further capital account liberalization may outweigh the 
risks of such a strategy. At the moment this is still a distant future to 
trigger such analyses taking into account the recent failure to NATO 
membership expectations and the fragile expectation of EU candidature.  
? Capital account liberalization could pose major risks if implemented in 
unfavorable circumstances. In the case of Macedonia with the fixed 
exchange rate regime, and especially when domestic macroeconomic 
policies might not be consistent with the requirements of the regime, it 
can be a reason for crises. For instance, capital account liberalization can 
aggravate risks associated with imprudent fiscal policies by providing 
access to excessive external borrowing. The foreign borrowing and 
overall fiscal sustainability is very important issue in the light of the 
fixed exchange regime in Macedonia and higher degree of capital 
mobility.  Macedonia might maintain or only gradually ease capital 
controls while moving toward a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
Premature opening of the capital account can also pose serious risks 
when financial regulation and supervision are inadequate.  
? The only transmission mechanism in Macedonia is through the exchange 
rate, as per Bank’s sources. This could be due to inadequate NBRM 
framework and lack of instruments and/or lack of competition and the 
possible oligopoly of the banking sector. 
? Thus, it is important that the range of instruments for implementing 
monetary policy will be widened in Macedonia (see IMF 2005). The 
NBRM will consider introducing a low-interest deposit facility, which 
will complete the interest rate corridor, thus providing a guide for 
market expectations of interest rates. This instrument might take effect 
on the behavior responses on the credit supply. Namely, the risk averse 
banking sector in Macedonia, and its most likely oligopoly position so 
far, was investing in the high interest instrument of the NBRM and were 
not increasing the lending to the private sector. NBRM also, plans to 
improve the guidelines on the currency composition of reserves, the 
management of the benchmark portfolio and its intended maturities. 
? Related to the relevant institutions. Their importance is crucial since the 
view of free capital markets delivering efficient allocation of resources 
is only a theoretical fragment with no ground in reality. In reality this 
market is distorted with incomplete information on different levels: 
adverse selection, moral hazard (up to the extreme case of gambling for 
redemption as the case with the Export-Import Bank) and herding. Thus, 
the story of efficient allocation is true only if the regulator have 
developed policies (prudential supervision and well developed lender of 
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last resort system) to limit the incomplete information and contain the 
potentially damaging consequences. 
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